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Abstract
The phenomenon of China’s rise has urged some to look for International
15Relations (IR) theories with ‘Chinese characteristics’. A number of these
have been associated with the ‘relational turn’. Yet, attempts to bring the
Anglophone and the Sinophone strands of the relational turn have failed
to transcend the bifurcating metanarrative of the mainstream. To rectify
this trend, the analysis engages the literatures on guanxi, the relational
20turn, and Chinese IR and develops a normative claim about the underlying
relationality of knowledge production in post-Western IR. The contention
is: (i) that the criticism of substantialism offered by the Anglophone litera-
ture on the relational turn fails to overcome its Eurocentrism; (ii) that by
subscribing to the epistemic duality of the West vs. the non-West, the
25Sinophone literature has aborted the political promise of the concept of
guanxi. The study deploys guanxi to amplify the intrinsic relationality both
of global life and the realms of IR.
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Having perused the present translation of the scriptures in Chinese, I
find it exceedingly verbose, containing much foreign phraseology, so
contrary to the usual style of our books that the Chinese cannot thor-
oughly understand the meaning. It ought to be known that, in the
5Chinese, phrases have a certain order, and characters a definite applica-
tion, which cannot be departed from with propriety. . . Now it appears
to me, that the present version is in Chinese words, but in many respects
arranged according to the English idiom (emphasis added). In a transla-
tion, the sense ought certainly to be given, according to the original;
10but the style should be conformable to native models: thus everyone
will take up the book with pleasure, and read it with profit.
Chooh Tih-Lang (quoted in Medhurst, 1838, p. 549)
1 Introduction
How China thinks and in what ways its history and traditions inform
15the idiosyncrasies of China’s international outlook have grown into a
cottage industry both in International Relations (IR) and across the full
spectrum of the humanities and social sciences (Pan, 2012; Horesh and
Kavalski, 2014). It appears that at the heart of these investigations is
China’s positioning in European intellectual imagination as the ultimate
20Other or what Michel Foucault called heterotopia – a disturbing place,
whose difference ‘undermines language’. China becomes ‘the Other
country’ not merely because of its location on the opposite end of the
Eurasian landmass, but also because it represents ‘a culture entirely de-
voted to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the mul-
25tiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible
for us to name, speak, and think’ (Foucault, 2002, p. xix). In this set-
ting, it should not appear surprising that the promulgation of Chinese
concepts into the discourses of IR appears not only to question ‘the
very “constitutional structures”’ of the discipline (Carlson, 2010, p. 96),
30but also calls on IR theory to embark on the road less traveled of en-
countering the multiverse of relations animating global life.
It would therefore make sense to set off on this journey by recalling
the etymology of the term theory. The Greek word theoria meant ‘a
journey or a pilgrimage’, involving a willingness to travel to foreign
35locales that can then simultaneously inform and transform the ‘home’
of the traveller (Nightingale, 2004, pp. 4–9). Equally significantly, by
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providing a potent form of social interactions, the itinerant performa-
tivity of such theoretical travels seems to have played an important role
in shaping IR by providing opportunities for ‘constant reframing and
reconfigurations of participants towards each other’, which allowed the
5ancient Greeks to ‘imagine and exploit forms of inter-polis contact’
(Kowalzig, 2005). By extension, theorizing – as the 19th-century
Chinese interpreter Chooh Tih-Lang suggests in the epigraph –
becomes a relational process of irruptive translation that brings in
dialogue the form and substance of the languages and experiences of
10diverse and infinitely complex worlds. A complex ‘translingual practice’
(Liu, 1995), such relational knowledge production belies an openness
to the other which does not merely intertwine identity and alterity but
makes ‘the act of translating a process of continuous dislocation’
(Kavalski, 2018a, p. 6). Yet, in lieu of the messiness and dislocation as-
15sociated with such itinerant translation, IR theory seems to recognize
‘other’ forms of theory-building only to the extent that they can be
‘arranged according to the English idiom’. As such, while the
‘Anglosphere’ of IR knowledge production may claim to be global in
its reach, it is less so in its cultural underpinnings (Vucetic, 2011); in
20fact, it seems to offer non-Anglophone scholars only temporary ‘work-
er’s visas’ rather than granting them ‘the rights to “full disciplinary cit-
izenship”’ (Beier, 2005, p. 62).
So how can China’s rise be grasped if it is to be studied only in the
language of and from the perspectives of a small fraction of the IR
25community, while silencing the voices of all those who are unfamiliar
with it? The suggestion of this article is that IR theorizing needs to
learn and employ different languages if it is to offer a richer and more
nuanced account of the complex and heterogenous global life it seeks
to comprehend. Such an endeavor should resonate with much of what
30the mainstream already admits theorizing in IR is about – namely, the
identification, observation, explanation, and understanding of patterns
by looking at the record of what happens when international actors
come together in space and time. Perhaps, some would be surprised
that no other than Kenneth Waltz has postulated that theorization is
35an inherently relational interpretative endeavor. As he put it, IR theo-
ries ‘convey a sense of unobservable relations of things. They will be
about connections and causes by which sense is made of things observ-
ed’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 9). Waltz ascertained that such sense-making is
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transactional at the very level of ‘the observer’ and ‘the observed’.
Namely, IR theories are not objective representations of the world, but
‘artistic creations, shaped by the taste and style of a single hand [that
of the theorist undertaking the explanation and understanding]’
5(Waltz, 1979, p. 10; emphasis added). Thus, it is creativity and
improvization rather than the provision of prescriptive or proscriptive
solutions that promise to heal the habits of control, manipulation, and
exploitation associated with IR’s insistence on the separation between
subject and object, knower and known, self and other, mind and mat-
10ter (Kavalski, 2018b). While the insistence that IR theory is a relational
construct distinct from ‘the reality of international practice’ might ap-
pear radical to some (Waltz, 1979, p. 68), it merely draws attention to
the itinerant and translational nature of theorizing. Such framing
betrays the complex, eclectic, and nonobjective blend of cultural uni-
15versals and culturally specific patterns of social relations underpinning
the encounter with global life. The point is that Anglophone IR cannot
continue to ignore the flexibilities, contingencies, and transformative
possibilities engendered by the encounter with other lifeworlds and
knowledges, so that it can sustain the integrity of an outlook commit-
20ted to the analysis of discrete atomistic actors whose behavior is prede-
termined by the distribution and balance of power.
This study therefore intends an interpretative theoretical journey
into Sinophone concepts and definitions of the international with the
intention to explore whether they indeed are so heterotopic as to be
25unworthy of translation for IR theorizing. It has to be stated at the
outset that the focus on guanxi (traditional: simplified: ) is
not entirely coincidental. It is one of the words that make up the
Chinese term for ‘International Relations’ – guoji guanxi (traditional:
simplified: ). In this respect, it should appear sur-
30prising that there has been so little attention to the meaning and con-
tent of the terms that go into the making of the Chinese phrase for
IR. What is particularly telling is that one does not have to be fluent
in Chinese to encounter the complex texture of the term – for instance,
cognate social scientific fields such as Sociology, Cross-Cultural
35Communication, and Psychology offer a rich repository of information
about the meaning and practices of guanxi. The first part of this article
draws on these conversations to tease out the content and practices of
this term, as well as its implications for IR theory and practice. The
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attention is to the ways in which the affordances of relationality are
foreshadowed by the engagement with the concept of guanxi. The sec-
ond part of the article points to some of the ways in which the con-
cept of guanxi informs nascent modes of relational theorizing in IR,
5before discussing the normative aspects of this proposition in the
conclusion.
The necessary caveat is that the labels of Anglophone and
Sinophone are used in this study as operational shorthand, recognizing
the existence of two distinct ‘discourse communities’ in IR with sepa-
10rate (usually, local) Chinese and (global) English-speaking audiences
(Mokry, 2016, pp. 135–159). The acknowledgment of such separate dis-
course communities does not intend to reiterate essentializing ascrip-
tions of Western or Chinese characteristics. Instead, by demonstrating
that there is more than one way of seeing, hearing, and responding,
15the reference to Anglophone and Sinophone communities calls on IR
to overcome the ‘geopolitics of its knowledge-production’ by actively
engaging in translation, while remaining cognizant of the politics of
language in the study of global life (Mignolo, 2002; D’Aoust, 2012;
Kavalski, 2018c; Vale, 2014). At stake here is the ability to engage
20other ontologies as a way of learning different ways to observe and en-
counter the world, ourselves, and the problems that embroil us, and to
put such alternatives into a nuanced comparative conversation with
more familiar critical political lexicons and procedures inherited from
Anglophone academic scholarship (Kavalski, 2017, p. 166). On the one
25hand, such theorizing as itinerant translation discloses the world as a
multiversal space where alternative realities can and do coexist and
have done so for quite some time. On the other hand, such relational
knowledge production mandates tolerance of at least as much diversity
and contradictions as evident in the social relations being narrated
30(Kavalski, 2018a, p. 5). Thus, guanxi is deployed here as a heuristic de-
vice revealing the infinite capacity of (international) interactions to cre-
ate and construct multiple worlds rather than as a term illustrating the
actual practices of Chinese foreign policy. While such connections are
clearly there (especially, in places like Central Asia and in initiatives
35such as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ [OBOR]), the aim is to disclose an
epistemically and ontologically relational theory of IR made possible
by the encounter with guanxi.
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In particular, the intention is to make an analytical contribution to
the understanding and explanation of the post-Western flavors of rela-
tionality in IR rather than illustrate how China has been able to gain a
tremendous amount of goodwill and political capital in the Global
5South. The point is that IR knowledge – just like any other knowledge
– can neither pretend to be monological, nor exists in isolation; rather
to know one thing, IR scholars not only have to know and be curious
about a lot of other things, but also be willing to engage them (and
countenance others engaging) in imagining, questioning, advancing,
10and co-creating the range of ‘the plausible’ practices and theories for
their explanation and understanding (Kavalski, 2017, pp. 161).
Therefore, this is an article not about the international practices of
China, but about the ways in which Sinophone concepts – such as
guanxi – can aid the disclosure of alternative and, especially, relational
15modes of IR theorizing. Many scholars have bemoaned the unending
demand by Anglophone IR to constantly qualify, bracket, and signpost
their engagement with non-Western ideas because they stick out as
‘concepts that do not fit’ (Tickner, 2003), while the tendency to deploy
Western concepts – such as sovereignty, anarchy, democracy – in the
20abstract (not least because of their presumed universalism) has never
seemed to trouble Anglophone IR and in fact has been ‘fetishized’ by
its interlocutors (Chowdhry, 2007, p. 106; Kavalski, 2009, pp. 1–18).
While this article does not suggest that post-Western IRs must engage
in reverse ‘deflection’ (Morefield, 2014), it insists that IR can have
25(and, in fact, sorely needs) a culturally attuned and contextually ver-
dant engagement with ideas independent of the practices of the govern-
ments that administer the territories and societies from which such
ideas originate. The concluding section evokes these registers of world-
ing mutuality by elaborating the ways in which guanxi can help tran-
30scend both the expected and the Western/non-Western bifurcation that
dominates so much of the literatures both on relationality and IR the-
ory. The proposition of a nonbinary itinerant theorizing embraces the
political promise of engaging creatively with the contradictions, chal-
lenges, and opportunities of an entangled and unpredictable global life.
35By uncovering a range of alternative stories that need to be heard,
guanxi appears to provide a plausible answer to both the deconstruc-
tion of the hegemony of Eurocentrism and the reconstruction of the
IR epistemic community. It is through the itinerant translation of such
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relational knowledge production that IR can learn to be more demo-
cratic and truly global.
2 Guanxi: what’s in a name?
Perhaps, one of the most memorable images from the diplomatic rap-
5prochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of
China in the 1970s is the opulent banquet that President Richard Nixon
and Premier Zhou Enlai shared at the Great Hall of the People. In front
of the whirring cameras of international media, one of the most impor-
tant realignments of the Cold War period was taking place around tables
10brimming with sumptuous Chinese culinary delights dished out for the
Americans by their Chinese hosts. As the food historian Andrew Coe
reveals, Chairman Mao had personally instructed Zhou Enlai to restore
connections with the noncommunist world by wining and dining foreign
leaders (Coe, 2009). At the banquet in the Great Hall of the People,
15Premier Zhou presented Nixon with a bottle of moutai (distilled Chinese
liquor) which he had kept for over 30 years, while Mao personally added
a dish of hongshao huashi (a soy-sauce-braised herring tail) to the lunch
the two had on the previous day because of its symbolism for facilitating
difficult conversations (Kavalski, 2018a, p. 69). It seems therefore that in
20order to end the country’s self-imposed isolation, the Chinese leadership
was resorting to an age-old practice embedded in the traditions that
their cultural revolution intended to eradicate – namely, guanxi.
While several recent IR studies have made reference to the term
guanxi (Kavalski, 2012, 2016, 2018a; Huang and Shih, 2014; Uemura,
252015; Pan, 2016), the analysis provided here is distinguished for treat-
ing guanxi not just as an explanatory device for China’s diplomacy,
but as a key to a relational knowledge production and action in IR.
Also, none of the current IR accounts have engaged the complex his-
tory and etymology of this term. It is therefore necessary to offer a
30brief account of the meanings that this term has come to acquire as
the background to its deployment in IR’s knowledge production. To
begin with, guanxi appears to be one of those essentially contested
concepts, whose meaning and practices are anything but clear cut and
universally accepted (Hwang, 1987). Almost all commentators ac-
35knowledge the Confucian underpinnings of such practices, although
many also assert that guanxi has become a shorthand for patterns of
Relational IR theory and guanxi 7
thought and behavior predating the time and teachings of Confucius.
Rather than a constraining straitjacket, such intellectual legacy seems
to have provided an enabling platform for contingent innovation –
after all, Confucius himself acknowledged the entrepreneurial endeavor
5of his efforts by calling himself a ‘co-worker with antiquity’ (Ford,
2010, p. 17). More often than not, guanxi is understood to denote the
establishment and maintenance of ‘an intricate and pervasive relational
network’ engendered by the practice of unlimited exchange of favors
between its members and bound by reciprocal obligation, assurance,
10and mutuality (Pye, 1982, p. 882; Kavalski, forthcoming).
In this setting, banquet-giving – as both Henry Kissinger and Nixon
discovered in the early 1970s – performs a crucial role in engendering
and sustaining positive sentiments among participants, who might ini-
tially be inimical to one another. While not unique to Chinese culture,
15the practices of food-sharing play a distinct role in informalizing interac-
tions – especially, in transforming diplomatic relations into interpersonal
ones and drawing foreign representatives into establishing friendship ties
which then make them subject to the ‘blandishments and pressures of
the Chinese social order’ (Walker, 2012, p. 495). Solomon (1975, p. 53)
20observed at the time that ‘as the common [Chinese] saying goes, if you
eat the things of others you will find it difficult to raise your hand
against them’. And, indeed, the practice of food-sharing – especially, the
opulent Peking duck dinners that Kissinger and Zhou Enlai shared
during their secret negotiations in the run-up to the Mao-Nixon meeting
25– appears to have played an important role in lubricating the Sino-
American relationship. While the American diplomats commented (and
commended) the sophistication and deftness with which Zhou Enlai was
introducing and serving the various dishes, such meals both mellowed
the tensions and allowed the two sides to embark on the process
30of changing their preconceptions about one another (Coe, 2009,
pp. 228–230). The record of these diplomatic banquets illustrates the
key underlying feature of these kind of interactions (either in interper-
sonal or international relations) – the provision of a friendly feeling,
which personalizes the social process, infuses it with a sense of obliga-
35tion ‘to give, to receive, and to repay’, and ensures participation in ‘the
games of guanxi’ (Solomon, 1995, p. 152).
While guanxi has been labeled as ‘the lifeblood of all things Chinese
– business, politics, and society,’ ‘one of the most fundamental aspects
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of Chinese political behaviour’, the ‘key to the Chinese way of
thinking’, and a central philosophical concept that ‘reflects the Chinese
way to know about reality (ontology), the Chinese way to interpret re-
ality (phenomenology), and the Chinese values about humanity (axi-
5ology)’, its widespread usage appears to be of very recent provenance
(in Kavalski, 2018a, pp. 70–71). In particular, guanxi’s rise to promi-
nence seems to be closely associated with social, political, and eco-
nomic processes set in motion during the second half of the 20th
century across the ‘Chinese commonwealth’ – in Mainland China,
10Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore, as well as the Sinophonic
diaspora around the globe (Gold et al., 2002, pp. 13–14). In this set-
ting, guanxi has acquired positive connotations (associated with
bottom-up empowerment) and negative flavors (associated with graft),
both of which (i) arise from the propensity of its practices to subvert
15established structures of authority and (ii) reflect an idiosyncratic en-
counter between tradition and modernity in the sociopolitical and eco-
nomic development of the state (Yang, 2002; Ledeneva, 2008).
Probably, the central Confucian inflection of guanxi is the deonto-
logical commitment to act in accordance with social demands and
20expectations. It needs to be reiterated that these commitments are not
constraining, nor do they deny spontaneity and improvization; instead,
they merely reflect the dependence on and persistence of relationships
– both of which entail a ‘responsibility to respond to the reactions of
and needs of others’ (emphasis added) (Weakland, 1950, p. 365). In the
25Confucian framing, guanxi-practices are embedded in the four virtues
(benevolence [ren], appropriateness [yi], propriety [li], and wisdom [zhi])
and emphasize reciprocal obligations framed by five hierarchical social
relations: (i) ruler–subject; (ii) father–son; (iii) husband–wife; (iv) older
brother–younger brother; (v) elder friend–junior friend (Tu, 1985, p.
30162). It is often overlooked that these relations provide a framework
for acquiring knowledge about global life ‘by going beyond the self
and reaching out to the world’ (Fei, 1992, p. 67). The practice-oriented
social norms engendered by the four virtues intend a modicum of pre-
dictability in the encounter with ‘the unknown out there’ by evincing
35meaningful patterns across the contingency of human sociality, because
‘people who are so enmeshed in customary norms cannot behave in
any other way’ (Fei, 1992, p. 43). Such sense-making is premised on (i)
the willingness to expand one’s outlook ‘from the self to the family,
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from the family to the state, and from the state to the world (tianxia)’
(Fei, 1992, p. 66); and (ii) the practice of engaging the experience of
others in ways that are simultaneously unprecedented for, yet meaning-
fully continuous with, the specific social context (Jenco, 2016, p. 16).
5At the same time, framed by metaphors of kinship, the roles out-
lined by the five hierarchical social relations come with certain duties
that each side needs to enact. If those obligations are not fulfilled –
that is, if favors done are not reciprocated – the reputation of the
transgressor is tarnished. Thus, the implicit threat of social sanctions is
10often sufficient to ensure that favors are repaid, that obligations are
met, and that relationships are honored. It is important to note that in
a Confucian context, even though guanxi relations are asymmetrical,
they are nevertheless volitional – in other words, the structure of hier-
archy should not be misunderstood as giving one side influence over
15the other. On the contrary, the very nature of reciprocal obligation
belies its constraining power on both sides of the guanxi tie (Barbalet,
2015, p. 1046). In fact some have suggested a certain paradox of power
in guanxi, where owing to the structure of reciprocal obligation ‘the
weaker party is effectively and paradoxically more powerful than the
20stronger’; this tends to produce ‘higher levels of anxiety’ that the pre-
sumed or aspiring great powers have in a relational context because of
the constant need to receive affirmation about their reputational profile
(Hwang, 1987, p. 955; Barbalet and Qi, 2013, p. 412; Shih, 2016,
p. 690; Kavalski, 2018a, p. 84). This is one of the main distinctions be-
25tween a guanxi-informed ‘relational power’ and the ‘relational power’
model developed by Robert Dahl and David Baldwin (Barbalet and
Qi, 2013; Azmanova, 2018).
Thus, the interdependence, mutuality, and reciprocity characterizing
guanxi accord social relations much greater significance and relations
30are often seen as ends in and of themselves rather than means for real-
izing various individual goals. Maintaining ‘group harmony and integ-
rity is much more important than is insisting on disruptive equity’
(Hwang, 1987, p. 956). A central feature of guanxi’s network of recip-
rocal obligation is the claim that ‘the self so conceived is not a static
35structure but a dynamic process. It is a center of relationships, not an
enclosed world of private thoughts and feelings. It needs to reach out,
to be in touch with other selves, and to communicate through an ever-
expanding network of human relatedness’ (Tu, 1985, p. 133). The key
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inference is that participants in a guanxi perceive each other to be ‘role
occupants rather than individuals’ (Hwang, 1987, p. 945). This assump-
tion challenges all attempts to offer Confucian versions of either con-
structivism (Qin, 2009, 2011, 2016; Uemura, 2015) or the English
5School (Zhang, 2015). In other words, what changes in the process of
interaction are the roles that actors play, not their identity, subjectivity,
and/or individuality. This should not be misunderstood as a suggestion
that identities (in contrast to roles) remain immutable. On the contrary,
the point here is that by focusing on identities, IR analyses tend to
10reify misleading representational modes for explanation and under-
standing that freeze the flow of international interactions into static
relationships that actors have (‘as if they were those self-same, perma-
nent objects whose interactions with the world produce external cir-
cumstantial changes to the objects’) (Kavalski, 2018b). In the context
15of ongoing dynamic change, actors are their relationships. Roles there-
fore are not about identities (or prescribed by them), but about acting
on the world stage – an actor can play any role depending on the
circumstances.
Thus (and contra Wendtian forms of constructivism), rather than en-
20dogenous, roles are exogenous to actors and emerge in relation to the
context of interaction and change over time and space. In fact, the
very idea of intentionality itself ‘cannot be removed from the context
in which it arises’ (Wen and Wang, 2013, p. 187); role-demands never
emerge in the abstract nor are they pre-given, but are borne out and
25gain their meaning in the process of interaction. Depending on the so-
cial circumstances, an actor can be accommodative and generous (as
China seems to be in its interactions with East European or African
countries, for instance) and assertive and vengeful (as China seems to
act in the South China Sea) all at the same time. The role-centric fram-
30ing of guanxi underpins not only its malleability (i.e., that it can be
used for multiple and diverse purposes), but its potential to engender
resilient connections in the context of recognizing and influencing
emergent opportunities. Owing to the fluid ways in which these rela-
tional roles are lived, guanxi asserts that change rather than stability is
35an endemic feature of global life.
Both through attrition and accretion and depending on the circum-
stances, issues, and situations, the guanxi relationship has diverse and
contingent iterations which demand ongoing re-examination and
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adaptations from all those involved in its webs of reciprocal implica-
tion. Instancing such development are China’s practices of ‘plurilateral
regionalism’ (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]),
‘plurilateral embedded orders’ (such as support for the Chiang Mai
5Initiative Multilateralization), ‘plurilateral parallel orders’ (such as the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), and network governance (such
as the OBOR policy) (Chen, 2016). Such dynamic multiplicity of inter-
dependent conditioning factors engenders an interpersonal realm
whose complexity is only partially known to the participating actors.
10This outlook calls for a contextual attunement to the transient constel-
lations of factors and actors that impact on the content, trajectories,
and possible transformations in any social relationship – regardless of
whether they occur on interpersonal, regional, or global level. In par-
ticular, the long-term orientation of guanxi inserts a modicum of pre-
15dictability by lowering the transaction costs and ensuring the peaceful
resolution of conflicts. The underlying aim is to aid the ability to en-
gage an ever-changing world.
3 Guanxi and the relational turn in IR
What would a relational theory of IR look like if we were to imagine it
20with the help of guanxi? To begin with, the outline of such an endeavor
should not appear particularly outlandish (let alone heterotopic) to
those attuned to the inescapable condition of mutual encounter defining
global life (Kavalski, 2016, p. 559). The contention here is that the en-
counter with the notion of guanxi offers a relational IR theorizing as an
25optics which both acknowledges the agency of ‘others’ and through which
meanings are generated contingently through interactions in communities
of practice, whose relations are premised on the variable reputations of
participants and the necessity for ongoing reiteration of the commitment
to do things together. The following paragraphs offer a preliminary
30unpacking of some of the ways in which the concept of guanxi informs
such relational theorizing.
To begin with, while relationality has been mentioned in the
Anglophone IR literature earlier, the relational turn that has emerged
in the past two decades has been associated with the seminal study by
35Jackson and Nexon (1999). Drawing on the work of the sociologist
Mustafa Emirbayer, Jackson and Nexon distinguish between the
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‘substantialist’ and ‘relational’ foundations of theory-building. As a re-
sult, they map most of what we call IR theory within the former do-
main and suggest that the commitment to substantialism provides the
common denominator ‘cut[ting] across conventional divisions in the
5field, including theories in all the major “paradigms” of IR’ (Jackson
and Nexon, 1999, p. 293). Positing the existence of atomistic units (or
entities) before relations, the substantialist storytelling of IR asserts
that states are almost invariably the ontological priors for any kind of
theorization. This outlook then facilitates the entrenchment of the idea
10that international politics is almost by default anarchical and antago-
nistic. In other words, the assumption that relations are self-evidently
secondary to the primary condition of conflict on the world stage legiti-
mizes the post-ontological contention that peaceful coexistence is possi-
ble only through the complete mastery and subjugation of all forms of
15otherness (i.e., ‘domination over everything which is not itself’)
(Odysseos, 2007, p. xxxi).
It is in this setting that the Sinophone IR community – most promi-
nently, Qin Yaqing – have criticized the Anglophone IR mainstream
for its ongoing lack and inability to articulate a theory of relations.
20Qin faults Jackson and Nexon for their Eurocentric outlook which pro-
pounds an equally isolated (and isolationist) ‘relations-for-relations
sake’ approach as that of the substantionalism they seek to debunk
(Qin, 2009, p. 14). His broader critique is that the relationality pro-
pounded by Jackson and Nexon fails to decenter the monological
25knowledge production of IR. Thus, the exclusion (and expulsion) of
‘non-Western’ perspectives and experiences perpetuated from this ac-
count of relationality fails to trouble the underlying ‘individualistic
rationality’ (of substantialist IR) – which Qin defines as the underlying
‘metaphysical component of the theoretical hard core’ of Anglophone
30IR (Qin, 2016, p. 34). While Qin indeed might be correct about the
Eurocentric underpinnings of Jackson and Nexon’s model, his rela-
tional theory of world politics offers little room for acknowledging (let
alone working creatively with and through) the ‘circles of reciprocal
implication’ engendered by relationality (Coles, 2016, p. 49).
35Guanxi implies both a propensity and a capacity for living with and
in ambiguity. In this respect, it provides a ‘relational’ (as opposed to
‘rule-based’) framework for the meaningful contextualization in the
shifting patterns of global life (Qin, 2011, pp. 129–153). What passes
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for world affairs in such a context is not about ‘the application of ab-
stract norms to cases,’ but about ‘a set of particular international rela-
tionships, with concrete obligations defined within the context of each
relationship’ (Womack, 2008, p. 265). This understanding reframes
5power away from its association with the material possession of capaci-
ties for influence (regardless of whether they are coercive or not), but
as a ‘relational practice’ (Qin, 2009, p. 9). This then becomes the
centerpiece for a ‘logic of relationships’ animating global life (Womack,
2008; Kavalski, 2013; Shih, 2016). Such a logic assumes that ‘while the
10future is unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the
past and present. Therefore, the bottom line is that both sides feel that
they are better off if the relationship continues—this is the minimum
meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require
symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reci-
15procity [i.e., respect for the other]’ (Womack, 2008, pp. 295–297). The
relationality framed in this way is not about the hubris that we can
control outcomes and steer history, but about care, attentiveness, hu-
mility, and responsibility to others.
It should be stated at the outset that such framing should not be mis-
20understood as an indication of a selfless outlook on global life, but as
an effective strategy for managing a hyper-social environment. This as-
sertion recalls the qualification from the introductory section that the
present analysis of the relational universe of guanxi does not draw on
Chinese foreign policy practice, nor imply that China’s international
25interactions are informed by guanxi. Instead, the logic of relationships
outlines a social context for action in which goals can be achieved
through an active, committed, and responsible involvement in world
affairs that takes into account the broader context of international inter-
actions and the specificities of a particular interactive environment (re-
30gardless of whether it is bilateral or multilateral). This pattern demands
both contextual sensitivity and an ongoing commitment to the deliber-
ate practices of relationality from all sides involved in the interaction.
Such ‘ecology of action’ backstops an ethic of ‘living otherwise-
relationally’ (Rojas, 2016, p. 370) – namely, the cultivation of relational
35practices and circumstantial adaptations responsive to the emergent, his-
torically contingent, and self-organizing character of global life.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, a key feature of guanxi’s dynamic outlook
is the emphasis on harmony (Horesh and Kavalski, 2014, pp. 230–248;
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Nordin, 2016). Thus, just like the metaphor of anarchy backstops a
self-help international system prioritizing material capability, the narra-
tives of harmony outline a pattern of order premised on reciprocal
relationships which pays premium for the dedicated cultivation of con-
5nectivity in the context of an ongoing demonstration of respect for the
other. The point here is that guanxi ties are volitional – actors inten-
tionally commit to the interaction by demonstrating their willingness
to exercise self-restraint. Such guanxi dynamics should not be misun-
derstood as altruism; on the contrary, they are pointedly strategic –
10for instance, China’s global outreach can be read as a policy of
pre-emptive interaction intent on allaying the concerns of other inter-
national actors and motivated by ‘the hope for less future loss by pre-
serving positive relations with all concerned parties’ (Huang and Shih,
2014, p. 20).
15In such a relational setting, agency (especially, international agency)
is not about the intentional projection of self-interest, but about strate-
gic receptivity – i.e., ‘knowing oneself insofar as one is related to
others, and knowing others insofar as others are related to oneself’
(Wen and Wang, 2013, p. 192). Rather than impeding the policy pro-
20cess, such contextual attunement discloses the unexpected opportunities
made possible by the pattern of guanxi – for instance, as evidenced by
the unintended evolution of the Shanghai-5 into the OBOR initiative
via the SCO. This development reflects the way in which the reciproc-
ity, complementarity, and correspondence of guanxi-relationality can
25change both perceptions of agency and context by creating unantici-
pated, visible, and committed coordination between two or more
actors. Order in this setting is a dynamically constituted outcome of
social interactions and participatory cognition, which is fluid, context-
sensitive, and temporal. Thus, what began as a single-issue relationship
30(border demarcation between China and the Central Asian states)
addressed through a series of bilateral diplomatic arrangements (the
Shanghai-5), grew into a multilateral organization (the SCO), which
then spilled over into the most extensive connectivity project the world
has seen (OBOR).
35The inference here is that international agency emerges in a commu-
nity, not in a vacuum. In particular, it is communities of practice that
locate guanxi’s logic of relationships. The animating force of such rela-
tionality appears to be a commitment to the practice of doing things
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together which affords ongoing opportunities for interpretative articu-
lation and re-articulation of international exchanges that can engender,
enhance, and reaffirm the reputational profile of participating actors –
an aspect that can explain China’s general aversion to the imposition
5of conditionality on its partners. The accent is on the strategic value of
maintaining the relationship rather than on the pursuit of immediate
gains. In this respect, the interactive dynamics of communities of prac-
tice stimulate new and contextual definitions of the ‘common good’ by
drawing attention to the distinct roles and positions that international
10actors take in diverse spatial and temporal contexts. In this process,
communities of practice reveal a new way of being present in the world
through the binding power (as well as social energy) of deliberate
interactions.
Thus, as the hub of social knowledge and social life, guanxi-ties inti-
15mate that shared understandings are not imposed as rules, rights, or
obligations, but emerge in, from, and through the very process of inter-
action. Guanxi, thereby, presages an understanding of international ac-
tion and agency – both cognitively and affectively – as simultaneously
shaped and mediated by ethical obligations and commitments to others
20(the structure and content of which is acquired through the very rela-
tionships by which ethical obligations and commitments to others are
disclosed). At the same time, the context provided by communities of
practice rearticulates agency as being compelled by the demands made
by the other participants in the interaction. This requires skills for liv-
25ing (if not, thriving) in a social environment beyond the control of any
of the participating actors. Such relationality is not zero-sum – i.e., ‘the
debit and credit sides of this [relational] balance sheet are never in
equilibrium’ – because this would spell the end of guanxi (Yeung and
Tung, 1996, p. 20). What is important emerges not as a result of indi-
30vidual decisions, but relationally in the process of interactions with
others and becomes meaningful in the social context of doing things
together with them.
The currency of such relationality is not legitimacy (as most IR
scholars seem to suggest), but reputation. The cultivation of reputation
35(a feature which IR observers tend to subsume within the analyses of
status) is probably the key aspiration of guanxi. As Jack Barbalet co-
gently observes, reputational standing is a social resource and not an
economic one. Thus, guanxi is deployed not with the aim to gain access
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to economic or political resources, but is ‘primarily directed to acquir-
ing and expending social resources’ (Barbalet, 2015, p. 1044). Not only
that, but the strategic aim of guanxi is to enhance the reputation for
trustworthiness of actors by providing a series of situations in which
5they can continuously enact (as well as be evaluated on) their ‘meeting
the expectations of others’ (Ho, 1976, p. 873). Under the Confucian
understanding of harmony, losing the trust of the other participating
actors is the greatest danger to the relational world order enacted
through the practices of guanxi (Huang and Shih, 2014, p. 19). In this
10setting, China’s insistence on the harmonious respect for the other can
be read as nothing short of a strategic desire for the recognition of its
reputational profile on the world stage.
Conclusion: the relationality of post-Western IR
The preceding sections demonstrate the promise from drawing on the
15Chinese concept of guanxi in order to amplify the intrinsic relationality
of global life and the realms of IR. In contrast to the dualistic bifurca-
tions that dominate IR imaginaries, the concept of guanxi illuminates
that the complex patterns of global life resonate with the fragility, flu-
idity, and mutuality of global interactions, rather than the static and
20spatial arrangements implicit in the fetishized currency of self-other/
center-periphery/hegemon-challenger models underpinning the binary
metanarratives of IR. This is a major departure from the current state
of the art on relationality in IR; rather than looking at dyadic sets of
relations as well as the identities and capacity of individual actors, the
25preceding engagement with guanxi inheres an IR pivoted on webs of
figurations intertwined by a conscious and strategic search for relations
with others. As the sociologist Fei Xiaotong (1992) points out, the rela-
tional model (guanxi moshi) of knowledge production relies on engag-
ing with and learning form the experience of others. Known as tui
30‘pushing or extending . . . to reach out to the world’, such sense-
making turns ‘the unknown [into] the familiar’ through the sociality of
ongoing interactions – namely, ‘first we encounter, then we practice’
(Fei, 1992, pp. 42–67). In this respect, actors (and their agency) have
effects only to the extent that they are in relations with others. Thus,
35owing to the dynamic nature of such interactions, what passes for
world order is not only constantly changing, but demands ongoing
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commitment to participating in and maintaining relations. With this in
mind, the concluding section of the article offers a relational reading
of China’s rise before sketching some of the implications for post-
Western IR theorizing.
5The heuristics of guanxi suggest that shifts in material capabilities
do not in and of themselves reveal much about the patterns of world
affairs unless they are assessed in their interactive environment.
Drawing on the narratives of power transition, the story of China’s
rise takes as its point of departure the dyad of hegemon-challenger –
10the former unwilling to relinquish its leadership position, while the
latter has growing capacities and aspirations to claim it (by force, if
necessary). The impoverished Cartesian outlook of this IR narrative
prescribes the transformation of generic fears into specific threats
which then inform policies of alliance-building or offer opportunities
15for military conquest. It is therefore not surprising that more often
than not the discussion of China’s rise turns into a conversation about
if and when a Sino-American military conflict would likely erupt. The
alternative narrativization provided by a relational IR theorizing treats
China’s rise as a socially negotiated practice (for which power transi-
20tion offers, at best, only a partial label). It would be a mistake to
assume that such relational reading proscribes antagonism or confron-
tation. (Radical) Difference – such as the one associated with the
phenomenon of China’s rise and the episteme of guanxi – is the very
condition for the possibility of emergence and innovation in global life.
25Thus, rather than something that needs to be controlled, subjugated,
or denied, the difference of China’s rise can be translated through the
relational lens of ‘interdependence-in-antagonism’ – a normative stance
that treats cooperation and competition as corresponding forces which
underpin the mutual dependence of all those inhabiting global life
30(Patoma¨ki, 2002, p. 62; Kavalski, 2017, p. 163). As such, rather than a
condition requiring ongoing securitization, difference discloses ‘a rela-
tion that brings disagreements into the conversation’ and forces
the mechanisms that proscribe ‘other forms of being and knowing to
become visible’ (Rojas, 2016, p. 380; Walton and Kavalski, 2017,
35pp. 207–221).
In terms of the epistemic difference of guanxi, the claim here is that
nonbinary relationality has become a defining feature of post-Western
IR theory-building and knowledge production (Bilgin and Ling, 2017;
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Chen, 2014; Cho, 2015). It seems few today would dispute that the dis-
ciplinary inquiry of Anglophone IR is indelibly marked by the ‘colonial
signs’ of its Eurocentric makeup. Not only that, but the ‘apple pie’ fla-
vor that IR acquired in the context of its Cold War transformation
5into an ‘American social science’ seems to have made the discipline
even more inimical toward encounters with the various non-Western
others that its outlook consciously occludes (Kavalski, 2012, p. 19). In
an attempt to trouble the juxtapositions of temporal and geographical
difference that still seem to stump any IR alternative prefixed by a
10‘non-’ or a ‘post-’, this article has posited the centrality of relationality
as a distinguishing feature of all such projects. In this setting, the rela-
tionality lens helps outline the contested terrain of post-Western IR as
a space for dialogical learning, which encourages engagement with the
possibilities afforded by the interactions of multiple worlds and privi-
15leges the experiences and narratives of neither of them (Kavalski, 2016,
p. 553).
Such mode of theorizing allows building solidarity between like-
minded projects, targeting the silencing, hegemony, patriarchy, and
violence of the mainstream by treating them as second-order aspects
20deriving from a first-order problematique – IR’s poignant ontological
and epistemic lack of relationality (Barbalet, 2015; Kavalski, 2015a). It
is the very denial of relationality (first-order issue) that perpetuates the
imperial, patriarchal, and racist attitudes (second-order issues) of IR.
It is in this vein that the attack on the latter, that so much of critical,
25feminist, and postcolonial theorizing undertakes, overlooks the very
condition of its possibility – the lack of relationality in IR. What this
means is that the IR mainstream has been dominated by an atomistic
understanding of global life which prioritizes fixed units of analysis
(nation states) and their discrete dyadic interactions (conflict/balancing
30in the context of anarchy). Yet, at no point is the option of a sociabil-
ity infused with the contingent opportunities inherent in the encounter
with the other acknowledged in this narrative; let alone the potential
that the phenomena and processes animating world affairs are mutually
co-constituted in relation to one another (Kavalski, 2015b). Instead,
35global life is envisioned as a domain of disconnected states, infamously
imagined as billiard balls – ‘closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit[s],
completely separated from all other states’ (Wolfers, 1962, p. 19).
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A relational IR theorizing – which is nonbinary in the sense that it
does not treat the West and the non-West as discrete and disconnected
homogenous opposites, but intertwined and mutually constitutive webs
of interactions – proposes a molecular outlook whose unit of analysis is
5relations (rather than actors) and their multiple triadic dynamics (which
open numerous and numinous points of and possibilities for interac-
tion). IR theorizing is not merely about the provision of knowledge (in
the sense of a positivistic measuring exercise); rather, it is about forming
than purely informing; it is about the art of living than de-contextual
10and detached abstract thought; it is about doing ethical considerations
in theory and in practice. In other words, what makes post-Western IR
narratives ‘post-Western’ is their emphasis on irruptive relationality –
namely, things in global life are not merely interconnected, but that they
gain meaning and significance within complex webs of entanglements
15and encounters with others. The proposition here is that the disciplinary
mainstream (and particularly its Anglophone variants) has, on the one
hand, evaded the need to recognize that there are dynamics which are
not only unknown, but probably cannot ever be meaningfully rendered
comprehensible, and, on the other hand, has stifled endeavors that can
20engage in thoughtful deliberation of the discontinuities, unpredictability,
and nonlinearity of global life. It is in this setting that this study posits
post-Western IR as necessarily contextual, incoherent, and socially medi-
ated – just like the everyday patterns and practices of the global life it
intends to explain and understand. The emphasis on relationality
25thereby acts as a reminder that IR knowledge, just like any knowledge,
is acquired and mediated relationally through diverse sets of practices;
as such, the myriad interpretative entanglements of people, powers,
and environments (as well as their complex histories, cultures, and
agency) stimulates an awareness of the dynamically intertwined contin-
30gencies through which different paradigms have come to be articulated
and assembled in ways that could have been – and could become –
significantly different (Coles, 2016, p. 121; Kavalski, 2017, p. 167).
Thus, the curious and provocative entanglements with the complex-
ity of global life invoke the pluriverse of possible worlds. It is relations
35that are not only at the heart of explaining and understanding the
world, but also central to its observation and encounter. The epistemic
(and ethical) verso of relational IR is about the cultivation of attentive-
ness to the self-organizing, shifting, and historically and geographically
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contingent realities of global life. Such attentiveness will make IR re-
search doubtlessly messy. Yet, such messiness is needed if IR is to re-
cover a disposition for encounter and engagement with the currents,
trends, and voices that are occluded, uncomfortable, and not easily di-
5gestible by established paradigms. Thus, the encounter with the concept
and practices of guanxi invokes the complexity of possible worlds un-
covered by relational IR theorizing. After all, what is IR as a discipline
if not the conscious exploration and encounter with the interstitial and
relational. China’s rise – as a phenomenon, narrative, and a set of pro-
10cesses – reminds us that global life is not necessarily a place where in-
ternational actors merely find themselves in; it is where they get lost in
the complexity of interactions and relationships.
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